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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

JEFF CLAUDE REED,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 990973-CA

Priority No. 2

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the State/Appellant's opening
brief, the State submits the following points in reply to the statements and arguments
contained in defendant/appellee's responsive brief.
DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE PRECURSOR MUST BE EXACTLY
CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH THE DATE GIVEN ON THE
INFORMATION IS INCORRECT
In his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court properly dismissed the charges
against defendant because the State did not establish at the preliminary hearing that
defendant possessed a controlled substance precursor or laboratory equipment or supplies
on December 16, 1998, the specific date listed on the State's information. See Aple. Br.
at 13. "In other words, the hole in the state's case related to the second element, whether

Jeff possessed a precursor or laboratory equipment or supplies, and not to the third
element, whether Jeff had the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation." Id.
Defendant argues that, because no precursor was actually found in defendant's possession
on the date listed on the information, the charge of possession with intent to engage in a
clandestine laboratory operation must be based on possession of the laboratory equipment
or supplies found in the basement of his home on that date. The failure of the State to
affirmatively connect defendant to the downstairs laboratory, according to defendant, is
fatal to the State's case.
However, the Utah Supreme Court has held that, because "the time an offense was
committed is generally not an element which the prosecution must prove at trial," a
deviation of proof from the date given on a criminal information is not fatal to that
information. State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1213 (Utah 1987). Consequently, although
an information may include an approximate date ("on or about") on which the alleged
criminal activity took place, the State ordinarily is not required to prove that the activity
actually occurred on that date. See id. Thus, a four-day variance from the date set forth
in the information is not necessarily fatal to that information. See id. at 1216. Moreover,
"[a] greater variance is permissible where time is not a critical issue at trial." Id.
(indicating that ten-day variance is not necessarily fatal). "[I]f a defendant's substantial
rights are not prejudiced, a variance in the evidence from the date alleged in the
information is not grounds for reversal so long as the evidence supports a conviction for
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the offense within the statute of limitations." State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah
1988); see also State v. Woolsey, 19 Utah 486, 57 P. 426, 427 (Utah 1899) (same in case
involving grand larceny); United States v. Morris, 700 F.2d 427, 430 (1 st Cir. 1983) (same
in case involving prostitution ring); State v. Nunez, 668 F.2d 1116, 1127 (10th Cir. 1981)
(same in case involving possession of counterfeit bills); State v. Smith, 652 P.2d 703, 708
(Kan. 1982) (noting that "[t]his appears to be the general rule throughout the United
States"); cf. State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1033 (Utah 1991) (noting case in which
seventeen-day disparity was held harmful).
Thus, contrary to defendant's assertion, the State here did not have to prove that
defendant was in possession of any contraband items on December 16, 1998. It needed
only to establish that defendant possessed the contraband "on or about" December 16.
See Fulton, 742 P.2d at 213, 216.
At defendant's preliminary hearing, the State presented the following evidence:
a.

That defendant moved into Carol Peterson's
home shortly after Thanksgiving Day,
November 26, 1998 (R. 136:9, 42);

b.

That after defendant moved in with Ms.
Peterson but prior to December 16, 1998,
defendant boasted that he knew how to make
methamphetamine and kept talking to Ms.
Peterson "about wanting to throw a big batch"
(R. 136:56);
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c.

That some time later, but again prior to
December 16, 1998, defendant purchased
pseudoephedrine, a methamphetamine precursor
(R. 136:12,44-45);

d.

That still some time later yet still prior to
December 16, 1998, defendant placed
pseudoephedrine tablets in a solvent, which is
one of the steps in the process to making
methamphetamine (R. 136:47-48); and,

e.

That, on the same day, defendant gathered red
phosphorous—also used to make
methamphetamine—from matchbook striker
plates (R. 136:36).

Based on the standard of proof applicable to preliminary hearings under State v.
Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 437-38 (Utah 1998), see Aplt. Opening Br. at 12-13, this is
sufficient evidence to establish that defendant possessed a controlled substance precursor
at some time between November 26, 1998 and December 16, 1998. This period of time is
sufficiently close to "on or about December 16, 1998" to be included within the offense
with which defendant was charged in the information.
This is especially so where at no time before the magistrate or the trial court did
defendant claim that the date provided in the information was too indefinite to provide
him sufficient notice to prepare his defense.1 "[T]he notice to which a defendant is

]

Before the trial court below, defendant claimed only that he had repeatedly denied
"involvement in any lab at this time or location" (R. 119-20). As discussed in the State's
opening brief, a connection between defendant and an actual clandestine laboratory is not
an element of the offense with which defendant was charged. See Aplt. Opening Br. at
11.
4

constitutionally entitled may come through one or all of three sources: the charging
information, a response to a bill of particulars under rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, or a response, under section 77-14-1 of the [Utah] Code, to a demand
for the place, date, and time of the offense charged." State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028,
1031-32 (Utah 1991). "However, if a defendant fails to request a bill of particulars or
make a demand for the date, place, and time under section 77-41-1 and a response to
either of these would have cured the claimed deficiency, then he or she will be deemed to
have waived the constitutional right to adequate notice." Id. at 1032. "It is the
defendant's burden to demonstrate why the precise date is necessary for the adequate
preparation of the defense." State v. Hickey, 584 A.2d 473, 475 (Conn. App. 1991); see
also Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1033 (concluding that "Wilcox has not shown any specific harm
to his defense that he likely will suffer as a result of the lack of exact dates and times").
In any case, the information here specifically identified pseudoephedrine—the
precursor which defendant had recently purchased with Ms. Peterson—as the controlled
substance precursor that served as the basis for the controlled substance charge; in
addition, the probable cause statement included in the information charging defendant
here stated that "Defendant Reed stated that he has purchased supplies for others to
produce methamphetamine at the residence" (R. 3, 5). Specific allegations within an
information may serve "as a basis for limiting the time frame covered by the
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[information] and giving defendants notice of the scope of the charges against them."
United State v. Laykin, 886 F.2d 1534, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989).
Because the evidence produced by the State at defendant's preliminary hearing
was sufficient under Talbot to conclude that, on or about December 16, 1998, defendant
did possess a controlled substance precursor or laboratory equipment or supplies in Ms.
Peterson's home with the intent to engage in a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory,
the trial court erred in quashing the magistrate's bind-over order.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the trial court's quashal of the bindover and reinstate the information.
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